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Cascading failures triggered by trivial initial events are encountered in many complex systems.
It is the interaction and coupling between components of the system that causes cascading failures.
We propose a simple model to simulate cascading failure by using the matrix that determines
how components interact with each other. A careful comparison is made between the original
cascades and the simulated cascades by the proposed model. It is seen that the model can capture
general features of the original cascades, suggesting that the interaction matrix can well reflect
the relationship between components. An index is also defined to identify important links and the
distribution follows an obvious power law. By eliminating a small number of most important links
the risk of cascading failures can be significantly mitigated, which is dramatically different from
getting rid of the same number of links randomly.
Cascading failures in complex systems are complicated
sequences of dependent outages. They can take place in
electric power systems [1, 2], the Internet [3], the road
system [4], and the social and economic systems [5]. For
example, in power grid a line is tripped for some rea-
son, such as error of operators, bad weather, or tree con-
tact, and the power transmitted through this line will be
redistributed to other lines, possibly causing other line
tripping or even cascading failures.
Several models have been proposed to study the gen-
eral mechanisms of cascading failures. The topological
threshold models [6] provide insight into several types
of cascading failures. The influence model [7] comprises
sites connected by a network structure and each site has
a status evolving according to Markov chain. In power
systems OPA (ORNL-PSerc-Alaska) model [8, 9] and its
variants, such as AC OPA [10, 11] and OPA with slow
process [12, 13], are proposed to study the complex global
dynamics of blackouts. More recently the line interaction
graph [14] initiates a novel analysis method for cascad-
ing failures in electric power systems by considering the
interaction of the transmission lines.
The system-level failure of tightly coupled complex sys-
tems is not caused by any specific reason but the prop-
erty that components of the system are tightly coupled
and dependent [15]. Based on this idea we quantify the
interaction of the components by an interaction matrix
and then propose a cascading failure model by using this
matrix. The interaction matrix can be obtained with
cascades from simulations or real statistical data. These
cascades can be grouped into different generations [16–
18] and are called original cascades to distinguish with
the simulated cascades in the following discussion. A
typical cascade can be:
generation 0 generation 1
25, 40, 74, 102, 155 72, 73, 82
Here the numbers are the serial number of the failed
components. This cascade has two generations while oth-
ers might contain one or several generations.
Topological properties such as small-world [19] and
scale-free [20] behavior have been found in complex net-
works. Power-law behavior is also discovered for weighted
networks [21]. In this paper we discuss the property of
the directed weighted interaction network rather than the
network directly from the physical system.
Assume there are m components in the system, we
construct matrix A ∈ Zm×m whose entry aij is the num-
ber of times that component i fails in one generation
before the failure of component j among all original cas-
cades. For each component failure in this generation we
find a component failure that most probably causes it.
Specifically, the failure of component j is considered to
be caused by the component failure with the greatest aij
among all component failures in the last generation, thus
correcting A to be A′ ∈ Zm×m, whose entry a′ij is the
number of times that the failure of component i causes
the failure of component j. An example is given in Fig. 1.
Then we can get the m×m interaction matrixB ∈ Rm×m
whose entry bij is the empirical probability that the fail-
ure of component i causes the failure of component j.
From the Bayes’ theorem we have bij = a
′
ij/fi, where
fi is the number of times that component i fails. The
B matrix actually determines how components interacts
with each other.
We propose a simple model to simulate cascading fail-
ures with B matrix. Initially all components are assumed
to work well and the cascading failure is triggered by a
small fraction of component failures. Since we would like
to focus on the interaction of components rather than the
triggering events, the component failures in generation 0
of an original cascade are directly considered as genera-
tion 0 failures in the simulated cascade. The columns of
B corresponding to the initial failures are set zero since in
our model once a component fails it will remain that way
until the end of the simulation. Then the component fail-
ures in generation 0 independently generate other com-
ponent failures. Specifically, if component i fails in gen-
eration 0 it will cause the failure of any other component
j with probability bij . Once it causes the failure of a
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FIG. 1. Illustration of correcting A to A′. Two consecu-
tive generations of a cascade are given. The last generation
comprises the failure of 25, 40, 74, 102, and 155 and in this
generation there are three component failures, which are 72,
73, and 82. (a) The numbers on the edges are aij , where i is
the source vertex and j is the destination vertex. (b) When
constructing A′, for the two consecutive generations 72, 73,
and 82 are considered to be caused by 74 since the aij starting
from 74 are the greatest.
component, the column of B corresponding to that com-
ponent will be set zero. All component failures caused
by generation 0 failures comprise generation 1. Genera-
tion 1 failures then generate generation 2. This continues
until no failure is caused.
An example for electric power systems is presented to
illustrate the proposed model. The original cascades are
generated by the AC OPA simulation. We use the form
of the AC OPA simulation in which the power system is
fixed and does not evolve or upgrade. As other variants
of the OPA model, AC OPA can also naturally produce
line outages in generations; each iteration of the “main
loop” of the simulation produces another generation. We
choose transmission lines as components and simulate a
total of 5000 cascades on the IEEE 118 bus system [22],
which represents a portion of a past American Electric
Power Company transmission system.
The complementary cumulative distributions (CCD)
of the total number of line outages for original and sim-
ulated cascades are shown in Fig. 2. It is seen that the
two distributions match well. In our case B is a rather
sparse matrix, a 186× 186 matrix with only 202 nonzero
elements. Just because of the interaction between com-
ponents denoted by this sparse matrix, the cascading fail-
ure is able to propagate a lot, which is suggested by the
dramatic difference between the generation 0 distribution
and the total line outage distribution. If the elements of
B are all zeros and the components do not interact, all
cascades will stop immediately after generation 0 failures
and the distribution of the total line outages will be the
same as generation 0 failures.
The nonzero elements of B determine how one com-
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FIG. 2. CCD of the total number of line outages for orig-
inal cascades (circles) and simulated cascades (rectangles).
Downward-pointing triangles denote CCD of the generation
0 failures.
FIG. 3. Links for the original and simulated cascades. Blue
links are shared by both original and simulated cascades; red
links are only for original cascades; green links are only for
simulated cascades; dots denote component failures.
ponent affects another. They are called links. A link
l : i → j corresponds to the nonzero element bij and
starts from the failure of component i and ends with the
failure of component j. These links form a directed net-
work, for which the vertices are component failures and
the directed links represent that the source vertex causes
the destination vertex with probability greater than 0.
Fig. 3 shows the network for both original and simulated
cascades. The shared links belong to set L1 and the links
only owed by the original and simulated cascades respec-
tively belong to set L2 and L3. In our case 133 links are
shared by the original and simulated cascades. 69 links
are owned only by the original cascades and 45 only by
the simulated cascades.
It seems that the simulated cascades are quite different
from the original cascades since there are many different
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FIG. 4. Diagram showing how Il is calculated.
links between them. However, it is not the truth if we
take into account the intensities of the links. The links
are not equally important and can cause dramatically
different consequences. We quantify the importance of a
link l : i→ j by an index Il, which measures the expected
component failures that a specific link l can cause on the
condition that the number of times that its source vertex
fails is known.
Specifically, assume a component i fails for Ni times,
the expected failures of component j will be Nj = Ni bij .
The expected failures caused by the failure of component
j is Nj
∑
k∈j bjk, where k ∈ j denotes the destination
vertices starting from j. We continue to calculate the
expected failures until reaching the leaf vertices. All the
expected failures are summated to be Il. In fact, Il =∑
v∈V Nv, where V is the set of vertices for which there
exists a path starting from link l and Nv is the expected
failures of vertex v. Fig. 4 lists all vertices that can be
influenced by link 12→ 18.
By using Il as weights of the links we can get a di-
rected weighted network corresponding to the nonzero
elements of B matrix. Denote the index of link l
for the original and simulated cascades respectively as
Ioril and I
sim
l .
∑
l∈(L1∪L3) I
sim
l /
∑
l∈(L1∪L2) I
ori
l is 1.007,
which means that the links of the original and simu-
lated cascades have almost the same propagation capac-
ity on the whole. Besides,
∑
l∈L1 I
ori
l /
∑
l∈(L1∪L2) I
ori
l
and
∑
l∈L1 I
sim
l /
∑
l∈(L1∪L3) I
sim
l are separately 0.975
and 0.992, indicating that the shared links play the major
role among all links.
For the shared links
∑
l∈L1 I
sim
l /
∑
l∈L1 I
ori
l is 1.025.
This suggests that the overall effects of the shared links
of the original and simulated cascades are close to each
other. However, it is still possible that the weights of the
same link for the original and simulated cascades can be
quite different. To show if the same link is close to each
other we define a similarity index S for the shared links.
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FIG. 5. (a) CCD of the link weights. (b) CCD of the vertex
out-strength. (c) CCD of the vertex in-strength.
S =
∑
l∈L1
(
Isiml + I
ori
l∑
l∈L1
(Isiml + I
ori
l )
Isiml
Ioril
)
(1)
When the important links of the original are close to
their counterparts for simulated cascades, S will be near
1.0. In our case S = 1.071, which means that most links,
at least the most important links, have similar propaga-
tion capacity for the original and simulated cascades.
The CCD of the link weights for the original and simu-
lated cascades are shown in Fig. 5(a). The two distribu-
tions match very well. Both of them follow obvious power
law and can range from 1 to more than 1000, suggesting
that a small number of links can cause much greater con-
sequences than most of the others.
The CCD of the vertex out-strength and in-strength
for original and simulated cascades are shown in Figs.
5(b)–5(c). Here the out-strength is defined as the sum-
mation of weights of the outgoing links from a vertex and
the in-strength is the summation of weights of the incom-
ing links to a vertex. An obvious power law behavior can
be seen, which means that most vertices (component fail-
ures) have small consequences while a small number of
them have much greater impact. Another point is that
the strength distributions of the original and simulated
cascades match very well, indicating that they share sim-
ilar features from an overall point of view.
We eliminate 5% of the links (10 links) by setting 10
nonzero elements in B matrix to be zero. We get Bint by
eliminating 10 links with the greatest weights and Brand
by randomly removing 10 links. In Fig. 6 we show the
position of the removed links in the interaction matrix.
Then we separately simulate cascading failures with the
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FIG. 6. Position of the removed links. Black dots denote
nonzero elements of B, among which the nonzero elements
removed by intentional mitigation and random mitigation are
denoted by red squares and green triangles.
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FIG. 7. CCD under two mitigation strategies.
proposed model by using Bint and Brand and the two
mitigation strategies are respectively called intentional
mitigation and random mitigation. Fig. 7 shows the
effects of the two mitigation strategies. It is seen that the
risk of large-scale cascading failures can be significantly
mitigated by eliminating only a few most important links.
By contrast, the mitigation effect is minor if we get rid
of the same number of links randomly.
To conclude, we quantitatively determine the inter-
action of components in the system by calculating the
probability that one component failure causes another.
By using this information we propose a simple model to
simulate cascading failures. The model is validated to
be able to capture the general properties of the original
cascades through comparison between the original and
simulated cascades. An obvious power law is found in
the distributions of the link weights and the vertex out-
strength and in-strength. The links have significantly
different propagation capacity. A small number of links
are much more crucial than most of the others and by
eliminating them the risk of cascading failures can be
dramatically mitigated.
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